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We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary process, which
we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi distribution function from statistical
mechanics. The inverse temperature in this process controls the intensity of selection, leading to a unified
framework for evolutionary dynamics at all intensities of selection, from random drift to imitation dynamics.
We derive, for the first time, a simple closed formula which determines the feasibility of cooperation in finite
populations, whenever cooperation is modeled in terms of any symmetric two-person game. In contrast with
previous results, the present formula is valid at all intensities of selection and for any initial condition. We
investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators in finite populations, and study the interplay between
intensity of selection and the remnants of interior fixed points in infinite populations, as a function of a given
initial number of cooperators, showing how this interplay strongly affects the approach to fixation of a given
trait in finite populations, leading to counter-intuitive results at different intensities of selection.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
More than thirty years have passed since John Maynard-
Smith laid the foundations of Evolutionary Game Theory [1].
In its context, the replicator dynamics equation [2, 3, 4] has
inspired mathematicians, physicists, biologists, economists,
psychologists, as well as political and computer scientists
to investigate the evolution of traits under natural selection
[5, 6, 7]. In the absence of mutations, and whenever pop-
ulations are infinite, homogeneous and well-mixed (each in-
dividual is equally likely to interact with any other individ-
ual), the (mean-field) description by the deterministic replica-
tor dynamics in which the abundance x of a strategy changes
according to its relative payoff, x˙ = x(pix − 〈pi〉), has led to
inumerous insights.
In spite of the insights provided by deterministic replicator
dynamics, it has been long recognized that populations, being
finite, will exhibit stochastic effects which may play a siz-
able role. Such behaviour is well-known in physics, where
stochastic effects in finite sized systems have been studied
for a long time [8, 9]. Studies of stochastic evolutionary
dynamics in finite populations, however, have been carried
out mostly numerically. Indeed, finite-size populations are
an ever-present ingredient in individual-based computer sim-
ulations [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18], which naturally
incorporate such stochastic effects. Different intensities of se-
lection have been employed in these studies, ranging from a
strong selection framework, captured by the finite-population
analogue of replicator dynamics [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] to an ex-
treme selection pressure under imitation dynamics, used as a
metaphor of cultural evolution [4].
Recently, the fixation probability of a trait under frequency
dependent selection in a finite population has been derived
[19]. In order to control the interplay of drift and selection,
an intensity of selection has been proposed, which measures
the impact of the game on the fitness and determines the am-
plitude of fitness differences on which selection acts. In such
a system, fitness is not the number of offspring, but a mea-
sure for the potential to reproduce. Analytical results were
obtained for weak selection, when the result of the game acts
as a linear perturbation to neutral drift. The biological rel-
evance of this weak selection stems from the fact that most
evolutionary changes are near neutral, i.e. have small influ-
ence on fitness [20]. Therefore, neutral selection can serve as
a reference point [19, 21]. It has been shown that the finite-
ness of populations may indeed lead to fundamental changes
in the conventional picture emerging from deterministic repli-
cator dynamics in infinite populations. For instance, a single
cooperator in a Prisoner’s Dilemma has now a small, yet non-
zero probability of survival in a finite population of defectors.
Conversely, it is not always certain that defectors wipe out co-
operators in finite populations [22, 23].
In physics, stochastic effects are often described in terms
of an effective temperature, a methodology which has proven
both successful and insightful at all scales. In line with this
long tradition, we introduce here a temperature of selection in
the evolutionary game dynamics of finite populations. Such
temperature controls the balance between selection and ran-
dom drift in finite populations, providing a convenient frame-
work to study evolutionary game dynamics at all intensities of
selection - from neutral, random drift, up to the extreme limit
of cultural imitation dynamics. We define the pairwise com-
parison process, which utilizes the ubiquitous Fermi distribu-
tion function at finite temperature. Making use of the Fermi
distribution, we provide for the first time a closed analytical
expression for the fixation probability in a finite, well-mixed
population of arbitrary size, for an arbitrary number of co-
operators at start, and for an arbitrary intensity of (frequency
dependent) selection. As a result, we are able to explore the
role of the temperature of selection in evolutionary game dy-
namics in what concerns the overall fixation probabilities for
different dilemmas.
General symmetric two player games can be interpreted in
terms of social dilemmas of cooperation [24, 25, 26, 27], in
2which cooperators and defectors interact via the payoff matrix
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
In all dilemmas mutual cooperation is favored (R > P ), al-
though individual reasoning often leads to mutual defection.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (T > R > P > S), the only stable
evolutionary equilibrium of the replicator dynamics is the sit-
uation in which all individuals are defectors. Other dilemmas
of cooperation are more favorable to cooperation, though. For
instance, whenever T > R > S > P , we enter the realm
of the Snowdrift Game, where it is best to do the opposite of
what the other player does: to cooperate if the other player
defects and to defect if the other player cooperates [33]. This
leads to the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors
under replicator dynamics, at the cooperator frequency
x∗ =
S − P
T + S −R− P
. (2)
In other words, starting from any given non-zero frequency
of cooperators in the population, the system will evolve to-
wards this coexistence equilibrium state. A third dilemma
arises whenever R > T > P > S, the so-called Stag-Hunt
game. In this case, one is better off doing whatever the other
player will do, which corresponds to a coordination game fa-
voring mutual cooperation (R). Indeed, replicator dynamics
predicts the existence of an unstable interior fixed point at x∗
given by Eq. (2), such that for frequencies above this point the
population will evolve towards 100% cooperation, the other
fate being associated with startup frequencies below the un-
stable fixed point.
As usual in Evolutionary Game Theory, the fitness of each
individual is associated with the payoff resulting from interac-
tions with other individuals from the population. Under strong
selection, an individual with higher fitness will always replace
an individual with lower fitness. Let us consider the follow-
ing process : Two individuals are chosen randomly from the
entire population - for example a cooperator C and a defec-
tor D, with payoffs piC and piD , respectively. Under imita-
tion dynamics, the fitter replaces the less fit with probability
p = 1. Similarly, under replicator dynamics selection always
increases the fraction of the fittest type. However, most evolu-
tionary changes have a small impact on fitness and sometimes
the less successful individual may actually replace the more
successful one. Whereas such occasional errors may be safely
neglected in large populations, they can have decisive effects
in finite populations [19]. These effects are nicely captured
by replacing the probability p above with the Fermi function
[5, 6, 18, 19],
p =
1
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
,
which gives the probability that C replaces D. Such a pro-
cess we call Pairwise Comparison. The inverse temperature
β ≥ 0 controls here the intensity of selection. For β → ∞,
the situation described above is recovered, i.e. the probability
for replacement of the less fit individual is one. However, for
any finite β, the reverse process may actually take place with
a non-vanishing probability given by 1− p. In particular, it is
interesting to consider this process for β ≪ 1, in which the fit-
ness has a marginal influence on replacement. For β ≪ 1, the
process described above reduces exactly to the frequency de-
pendent Moran process under weak selection, studied in [19].
Let us consider the general payoff matrix Eq. (??). When
the number of interactions per individual is very high, the pay-
offs will depend only on the fraction of both types in the pop-
ulation. If there are j cooperators and N − j defectors, they
will accumulate payoffs piC = (j − 1)R + (N − j)S and
piD = jT + (N − j − 1)P , respectively [31]. Self interac-
tions are excluded. Under Pairwise Comparison, and in the
absence of mutations, only when the two individuals chosen
have different strategies the total number of individuals with
a given strategy can change by one. Similarly to the Moran
process described in [19], this defines a finite state Markov
process with an associated tri-diagonal transition matrix. The
probabilities to increase the number of cooperators from j to
j+1, T+j , and the probability to decrease that number from j
to j − 1, T−j are
T±j =
j
N
N − j
N
1
1 + e∓β(piC−piD)
. (3)
For large populations, this process can be approximated by a
stochastic differential equation with drift T+j − T
−
j and dif-
fusion
√
(T+j + T
−
j )/N [30]. For the pairwise comparison
process, this yields
x˙ = x(1 − x) tanh
[
β
2
(piC − piD)
]
+
√
x(1 − x)
N
ξ (4)
where x = i/N is the fraction of cooperators and ξ is Gaus-
sian white noise with variance one. For N →∞, the stochas-
tic term vanishes. In this limit, the replicator dynamics [4]
is recovered from the first order term of a high temperature
expansion, β ≪ 1.
In finite populations, the quantity of interest in this process
is the fixation probability of cooperators, i.e. the probability
to end up in the state with N cooperators given that the ini-
tial number is k. This probability depends only on the ratio
αj = T
−
j /T
+
j . For the Pairwise Comparison process, this ra-
tio reduces to αj = exp [−β(piC − piD)]. In terms of αj , the
fixation probability φk is given by [32]
φk =
∑k−1
i=0
∏i
j=1 αj∑N−1
i=0
∏i
j=1 αj
, (5)
and the payoff difference can be written as piC −piD = 2uj+
2v, where 2u = R−S−T+P and 2v = −R+SN−PN+P ,
which simplifies the fixation probability to
φk =
∑k−1
i=0 exp [−βi(i+ 1)u− 2βiv]∑N−1
i=0 exp [−βi(i+ 1)u− 2βiv]
. (6)
3One can interpret the sums in the previous equation as nu-
merical approximations to the integral
∫ k− 1
2
− 1
2
∏i
j=1 αjdi. The
error of this approximation is of order N−2 and will therefore
rapidly vanish with increasing N . Replacing the sums by the
integrals leads to the surprisingly simple formula,
φk =
erf [ξk]− erf [ξ0]
erf [ξN ]− erf [ξ0]
(7)
valid for u 6= 0 where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 dy e
−y2 is the er-
ror function and ξk =
√
β
u
(ku+ v). For u = 0, which is
in Game Theory sometimes referred to as ”equal gains from
shifting”, we find instead
φk =
e−2βvk − 1
e−2βvN − 1
. (8)
This result is formally identical to the fixation probability of
k individuals with fixed relative fitness r = e2βv [28, 29].
Eqs. (7) and (8) reduce trivially to the neutral selection re-
sult φk = k/N for β → 0. In contrast with the results from
Ref. [19], these closed expressions are valid for any intensity
of selection and for any given initial number of individuals of
a given trait. Two limiting cases follow immediately: β ≪ 1
corresponds to weak selection and yields the generalization
of the weak selection result for the birth-death process given
in [19] to an arbitrary initial number of mutants. Strong se-
lection is described by β ≫ 1 and reduces the process to a
semi-deterministic imitation process: The speed of this pro-
cess remains stochastic, but the direction always increases in-
dividual fitness for β → ∞. This limit, which corresponds to
the cultural evolution models of imitation dynamics, is outside
the realm of the birth-death process studied in [19] and results
from the nonlinearity of the Fermi distribution function.
In the following we study the evolutionary game dynam-
ics of finite populations in some concrete cases, in connection
with the results shown in Fig. 1.
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma we choose R = 3, S = 1,
T = 4, and P = 2. Since u = 0, the fixation probability is
given by Eq. (8). In Fig. 1a we show a comparison between
the analytical results and extensive computer simulations for a
small population of N = 20 individuals. Clearly, cooperators
are always in disadvantage with respect to defectors. In spite
of the exponential increase of the fixation probability of coop-
erators with the initial number k, only for very weak selection
(β = 0.01) do cooperators acquire reasonable chances in a
population as small as N = 20. As stated before, the error
of the approximation leading to Eqs. (7) and (8) is of order
N−2. However, even for N = 20 excellent agreement with
numerical simulations is obtained as illustrated in Fig. 1.
As a second numerical example, we consider the Stag-Hunt
game given by the ranking of the payoff matrix illustrated
in Fig. 1b (note that we only changed the order of numer-
ical values from Fig. 1a). This system exhibits two pure
Nash equilibria, i.e. each strategy is the best reply to itself,
and any selection mechanism leads to a bistable outcome.
The replicator dynamics predicts a sharp transition from full-
defection to full-cooperation at the unstable fixed point x∗
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FIG. 1: Fixation probabilities for the three qualitatively different
dilemmas of cooperation describable by 2 × 2 games. Simulation
results (filled symbols) coincide perfectly with the theoretical result
Eqs. (7) and (8) (solid lines). For comparison, the theoretical result
for the Moran process at maximum selection intensity (w = 1, open
circles) and the neutral selection result (β = 0, diagonal line) are
shown. (a) In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, defection is dominant. As
a result, only for very weak selection (β = 0.01) cooperators ac-
quire significant chances of fixation. (b) The Stag-Hunt game has an
unstable equilibrium at k∗ = (N + 2)/2, and the transition across
this point depends sensitively on the intensity of selection. (c) The
Snowdrift Game exhibits an internal equilibrium at k∗ = (N−2)/2,
which is an inflection point in the theoretical curves. A small popula-
tion size of N = 20 has been chosen on purpose to stress the quality
of the theoretical result related to Eqs. (7) and (8). Each simulation
result corresponds to the fraction of fixation of cooperators in 104
independent realizations.
given by Eq. (2). In finite populations, this point is given by
k∗ = Nx∗ + (P − R)/(T + S − R − P ), where the second
term resulting from the exclusion of self interactions is irrele-
vant for large N . The transition at k∗ depends sensitively on
the intensity of selection, becoming sharper the larger the in-
tensity of selection. For the Moran process discussed in [19]
a smooth transition from zero to one is always observed in all
dilemmas, even when the intensity of selection is maximized
(w = 1), for which the fitness equals the payoff resulting from
the game (open-circles in Fig. 1). Hence, only for very smooth
transitions between the two absorbing states do the predictions
4in [19] apply. Eq. (7), instead, provides the overall scenario
for all intensities of selection without need to invoke the so-
called 1/3-rule.
The Snowdrift Game [33] (also known as ’Hawk-Dove’
game or ’Chicken’) characterized by the payoff ranking T >
R > S > P presents the most interesting scenario in this
context. This system exhibits a mixed Nash equilibrium at
k∗. Replicator dynamics predicts that any initial condition
will lead to this mixed-equilibrium. This is clearly not possi-
ble in a finite population, in which the system ends up in one
of the absorbing states k = 0 or k = N . For weak selection,
the fixation probability increases smoothly with k from zero to
one (open circles in Fig. 1c). As β increases, a plateau devel-
ops in the center region from 25% up to 75% of cooperators,
in which the fixation probability is roughly independent of k.
For β = 0.05 its value is ≈ 15%. For β = 0.1, the plateau
widens, but more interestingly, it shifts position, so that now
the fixation probability becomes ≈ 2%. This behavior is re-
lated to the location of k∗, which in the finite system leads to
the occurrence of an inflection point at k∗ in the fixation prob-
ability curves. With increasing selection pressure the proba-
bility distribution becomes sharply peaked around k∗. Hence,
the fixation probability of defectors rapidly approaches one, as
k∗ < 1/2. In this case, the remnant of the interior fixed point
leads to a fast increase of the time to fixation, which may be-
come arbitrarily long (a detailed account of the fixation times
will be published elsewhere [34]). This observation cannot
be inferred from the weak selection analysis of Ref. [19] and
contrasts sharply with the predictions from the replicator dy-
namics equation: For the stochastic system, fixation in x = 0
or x = 1 is certain, whereas the replicator dynamics predicts
coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
Throughout this work, we have followed the conventional
approach of evolutionary game theory assuming that the pay-
off matrices are constant and independent of β. However, the
intensity of selection and/or the payoff matrix may change
during evolution, a feature which would lead to a coevolution-
ary process that deserves further attention. One possibility is
a situation in which there is a certain amplitude of variation in
the payoff values during each interaction, for fixed β. To the
extent that these variations can be considered random, such an
effect might contribute (in a mean-field treatment) to an over-
all rescaling of the “selection temperature” leading to a new
value β′. Such new temperature would result from replac-
ing the distribution of fitness values among each of the two
types in the population by their average values. The theory
presented here may be viewed as accounting for such a mean-
field description, which will become more exact the narrower
the payoff distributions.
To sum up, the pairwise comparison process discussed here
provides an unified framework in which one can study evo-
lutionary dynamics in finite populations. We derived a sim-
ple formula which determines the fixation probability for a
given trait under frequency dependent selection, at all intensi-
ties of selection and for any given number of initial individuals
of that trait present in the population. In a finite population,
the only stable evolutionary outcome corresponds to all indi-
viduals sharing a common trait. The probability of fixation
in either of these traits, however, is a non-trivial function of
the number of individuals sharing that trait at start, depending
sensitively on the intensity of selection, thereby configuring
an interesting evolutionary scenario not accountable for pre-
viously. We have shown that with increasing selection pres-
sure the topological structure which is predicted by the deter-
ministic replicator dynamics in infinite populations plays an
increasing role. Depending on the nature of the game, we find
that the transition between competing extrema in coordina-
tion games exhibiting bistability gets sharper with increasing
selection pressure. On the other hand, for games exhibiting a
mixed equilibrium, the fingerprint of the stable mixed equilib-
ria reflects itself in the rate of fixation into one of the absorb-
ing states, which may increase prohibitively with increasing
selection pressure. In other words, even when fixation is cer-
tain, the time to reach it may become arbitrarily long.
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